ONLY A FREE VIETNAM
CAN STAND UP TO CHINA'S
BULLYING
EDITOR'S NOTE: A recent negotiation between Vietnam and China over the strategic Gulf of Tonkin shows China's regional ambitions. PNS contributor
Thi Q. Lam is author of the memoir "The 25-Year Century: A South
Vietnamese General Remembers the Vietnam War." He resides in Milpitas, Calif., where he teaches high school.
BY THI LAM, PACIFIC NEWS SERVICE
On Jan. 19, 1974, as Acting Commander of I Corps of the South Vietnamese Army in
Danang during the Vietnam War, I sent a patrol of F-5 jet fighters to destroy a
Chinese Naval Task Force that attacked our patrol boats on a routine supply
mission in the Paracel Islands, approximately 400 kilometers east of Danang.
Unfortunately, by the time they reached the islands, the F-5s ran low on fuel
and had to return to base without engaging the enemy.
Unknown to me at the time, the Chinese had every intention of controlling the Eastern Sea, with its huge oil reserve estimated
at tens of billions of barrels. In fact, in a letter to the Chinese government
dated Sept. 14, 1958, Phan Van Dong, then prime minister
of North Vietnam, officially confirmed China's territorial rights on the Paracel Islands, despite the fact that these
islands had been historically considered an integral part of Vietnam.
The Chinese missile that sent one of our naval patrol boats to the bottom of
the sea that fateful day in 1974 turned out to be the opening salvo for the
conquest of the Paracels and -- much later -- of the Spratly archipelagoes and
other internationally contested islands in the South China Sea. In particular, China's claims on the rich gas field near
the Natuma Islands, 400 miles northeast of Sumatra, Indonesia, and its dispute with Japan over the Senskaku Islands in the East China Sea almost sparked a regional crisis in
the late 1990s.
Today, recent territorial concessions from Hanoi -- the Vinh Bac
Bo (Gulf of Tonkin) Treaty and the Letter of Resolution on Fishing Collaboration
-- show China's southern expansionism has not
relented. The Vinh Bac Bo Pact effectively revoked the
Peking Treaty, signed by France and China in 1887. That treaty, using
Greenwich Meridian 108 East as the demarcation line, provided Vietnam and China, respectively, with 63 percent and
37 percent of territorial rights to the Vinh Bac Bo.
The new treaty, ratified without debate by Vietnam's rubber-stamp National
Assembly last June, replaced Meridian 108 E. with a central meridian located
west of the original line of demarcation, thus reducing Vietnam territorial
waters to about 53 percent. As a result, Vietnam lost approximately 12,000 square
kilometers of territorial waters. Considering usual geographical criteria such
as population density, number of islands owned, length of coastline, number of cities
of 100,000 people or more located on the edge of the gulf, Vietnam, in the view of top international
experts on the Law of the Sea, should be allocated at least 70 percent of the
Vinh Bac Bo. In addition to the Vinh Bac Bo Pact, Vietnam and China also signed a fishing agreement
that provided for a 60-nautical-mile-wide central common fishing area. However,
as Chinese boats are bigger and better equipped, they will dominate the
"shared" area. Furthermore, with fishing nets that can extend up to
50 nautical miles, Chinese boats need not leave the common area to catch with
impunity fish, shrimp and other marine products in close proximity to the
Vietnamese coast.
Some experts estimate that most of the marine fauna in the Vinh Bac Bo will be
extinct within a few years and as a result, millions of fishermen from Ninh
Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh and Quang Tri provinces will be
deprived of their traditional means of subsistence. Thousands might flock to
big cities looking for work, creating a social and political crisis with
incalculable consequences for the communist regime.
To generate new sources of energy, China has completed the construction of
one hydroelectric dam and plans to build six more on the Mekong River, in Yunnan Province. Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, tributary countries of the Mekong, are concerned about the long-term
economical and ecological impacts of these dams on the entire region. On the
economic front, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries, instead of
benefiting from China's blooming economy, have been complaining about the
latter's practice of flooding their markets with low-quality and cheap
products, making it hard for local producers to compete.
The recent U.S.-Vietnam rapprochement -- as evidenced by a U.S. naval vessel dogging in Saigon harbor and the Vietnam Minister of Defense visiting the
Pentagon last year -- obviously has not deterred China's new assertiveness, because the United States has its hands full in Iraq and the Middle East and has no time
nor the means to face the new Asian threat.
History has a curious way of repeating itself. In ancient times, Vietnamese
kings periodically sent ambassadorial delegations to the Peking Imperial Court to pay tributes to their powerful
masters to the north. This practice obviously is alive and well today, with two
major differences: The old kings and emperors have been replaced by authoritarian
rulers, and precious stones and ivories have been replaced by territorial
concessions.
Only a strong and prosperous Vietnam, enjoying popular support and the support
of the community of free and democratic nations, can preserve its territorial
integrity. If the Taiwan and South Korea experiences are any indication, it
is clear that only by implementing genuine political and economic reforms can Vietnam stand up to Chinese bullying and
break this cycle of humiliating concessions that has plagued it for so long.
Thi Quang Lam.